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The Japanese zero-interest rate period provides a “natural experiment” for investigating the 
effectiveness and transmission channels of sterilized intervention when traditional monetary 
policy options are constrained. This paper takes advantage of the fact that all interventions in 
the JPY/USD market during the zero-interest rate period are sterilized sales of JPY and, 
therefore, none of these interventions can signal a future interest rate decrease. In order to 
further assess through which transmission channel these interventions work, the analysis 
integrates official daily Japanese intervention data with a comprehensive set of rumors data 
that capture interventions of which the market is aware. Market awareness is a necessary 
condition for intervention to disseminate information and work through channels other than 
the portfolio balance channel. The results of the time series analysis show that intervention, 
on average, induces a statistically and economically significant same-day depreciation of the 
JPY. Market awareness is shown to be unimportant. Consequently, the effects of Japanese 
interventions  during  the  zero-interest  rate  period  are  consistent  only  with  the  portfolio 
balance channel. This is a remarkable finding, demonstrating that sterilized intervention is, in 
principle, an independent policy instrument. 
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1.  Introduction 
No previous study has taken advantage of the “natural experiment” provided by the Japanese 
zero-interest rate period to analyze the exchange rate effects of intervention when intervention is 
disconnected from traditional monetary policy moves.
1 The contribution of this paper is to assess 
whether sterilized intervention is effective when interest rates are zero  and intervention cannot 
signal future monetary policy changes, and to determine through which channel of transmission 
intervention during this particular macroeconomic environment works.
2 
The Japanese zero-interest rate period began in January 1999 when money market rates 
effectively hit the lower bound (see Figure 1). At the outset of this period, the Japanese monetary 
authorities, i.e. the Bank of Japan acting as the agent for the Japanese Ministry of Finance, 
entered an intervention regime of unprecedented proportions, selling an astonishing total of USD 
0.5 trillion worth of JPY against purchases of USD, roughly equivalent to 10% of Japan’s yearly 
GDP, over a period of little more than five years. With Japanese interest rates remaining at the 
lower bound throughout this prolonged period of frequent and often large-scale interventions, 
and  all  interventions  in  the  JPY/USD  market  carried  out  as  unilateral  sales  of  JPY  by  the 
Japanese monetary authorities, it is not possible for the interventions to send a signal of a future 
decrease in interest rates, thus effectiveness of intervention through the signaling transmission 
channel of future monetary policy is ruled out a-priori.
3 The Japanese zero-interest rate period, 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Ito (2003) for a study of Japanese intervention during the 1991 to 2001 period, and Fatum and 
Hutchison (2005) and Ito (2005) for studies focusing on the 2003 to 2004 period. Humpage (2003), Neely (2005), 
Sarno and Taylor (2001) and others provide surveys of the intervention literature. 
2  Few studies investigate the transmission  channels of intervention . Exceptions include empirical studies by 
Dominguez and Frankel (1993a), Fatum and Hutchison (1999), and Lewis (1995). Kumhof (2010) provides a 
theoretical model of the portfolio balance channel effects of intervention. 
3 Moreover, as discussed in Ito (2005), t he Japanese institutional framework for intervention, where  government 
bonds with 3-month maturity (so-called Fiscal Bills) are issued first in order to obtain the JPY necessary for carrying 
out interventions, guarantees that all interventions are sterilized , i.e. there is no institutional link between Japanese 
interventions  and  the  monetary  base.   Furthermore,  Fatum  and  Hutchison  ( 2005)  show  that  the  Japanese   3 
therefore,  provides  a  “natural  experiment”  for  investigating  the  effectiveness  of  sterilized 
intervention when traditional monetary policy options are constrained and, as a consequence, the 
signaling channel of intervention, often viewed as a particularly important transmission channel, 
is not functioning. 
  The  traditional  view  of  the  intervention  literature  is  that  if  intervention  works, 
intervention is effective through signaling (by carrying out intervention the central bank informs 
the market about its future monetary policy intentions) or through portfolio balance effects (by 
carrying out intervention the central bank changes the relative demand and supply of imperfectly 
substitutable foreign and domestic assets). More recently, an additional transmission channel, 
deemed  the  coordination  channel,  has  been  proposed  (by  carrying  out  publicly  announced 
intervention when individual market participants are hesitant to risk betting on a reversal of the 
exchange rate towards its equilibrium because of substantial exchange rate misalignment and 
coordination failure the central bank takes on a coordinating role that organizes “smart money” 
to enter the market at the same time, thereby causing the exchange rate to reverse).
4  
A  necessary  condition  for  intervention  to  disseminate information  and  be  effective 
through channels such as the signaling or the coordination channel, is that the market is aware of 
intervention being carried out (otherwise a signal about future monetary policy intentions or 
current exchange rate misalignments will go unnoticed, in which case it is not possible for  these 
channels  to function).
5  By contrast, the portfolio balance channel   does not require market 
awareness for intervention to work. Instead, this channel can only work if intervention is actually 
                                                                                                                                                             
interventions are not significantly linked to changes in the monetary base, i.e. the sterilized interventions of the zero-
interest rate period are not connected to the coinciding path of quantitative monetary easing. 
4 See Edison (1993) for a thorough exposition of the signaling and the portfolio balance channels, and Sarno and 
Taylor (2001) for details regarding the coordination channel  and a discussion of the relative importance of the 
transmission channels of intervention. 
5 While Sarno and Taylor (2001) suggest that intervention must be publicly announced in order for the coordination 
channel to function, market awareness based on rumors of intervention might be sufficient.   4 
carried out (otherwise the relative demand and supply of foreign and domestic assets do not 
change), and the larger the intervention volume the larger the portfolio balance effects. 
To address the possibility that market awareness of intervention matters, the analysis 
integrates the official Japanese intervention data with a comprehensive set of newswire reports 
capturing days on which there is a rumor of intervention – distinguishing between rumors of 
intervention  on  days  when  intervention  occur  and  rumors  of  intervention  on  days  when  no 
intervention occur - as well as days with official statements pertaining to intervention and the 
exchange  rate.  This  is  important,  not  only  because  other  studies  have  found  that  “oral 
intervention” can influence the exchange rate (see Fratzcher 2008 and others), but because if 
market awareness matters, effectiveness of intervention cannot be explained by portfolio balance 
effects alone. 
The existing literature combining intervention data with newswire reports of intervention 
generally uses newswire reports of intervention to indicate whether the market is aware of an 
intervention  or  whether  an  intervention  is  carried  out  in  secrecy.
6  However,  a  report  of 
intervention is  typically on the newswire the day after the intervention the report refers to is 
carried out.  For example, a firm report of the 12 January 1999 official Japan ese intervention 
operation is reported on t he newswire on 13 January 1999.   Therefore, whether or not an 
intervention is reported is generally a matter of “after-the-fact” information that can play no role 
in  the  contemporaneous  exchange  rate  response  to  intervention.  By  contrast,  rumors  and 
speculation of intervention are generally picked up by the newswire the same day they occur. 
Accordingly, the analysis of this paper uses rumors or speculation of intervention rather than 
reports of intervention to indicate market awareness as well as market perception of intervention. 
                                                 
6  See  Dominguez  and  Frankel  (1993a  and  1993b,  chapter  7)  for  influential  studies  that  use  news  reports  of 
intervention to classify whether an intervention is secret or reported.   5 
The analysis of the paper employs GARCH time series models for the baseline analysis, 
includes macro surprises in the estimations, tests for delayed effects, controls for endogeneity, 
and carries out a variety of robustness checks. In addition, the analysis pays careful attention to 
the possibility that institutional changes are associated with parameter instability and, as a result, 
carries out the analysis on the full zero-interest rate intervention period as well as separately on 
well-defined sub-samples. The results show that intervention, on average, exerts a significant 
same-day  influence  on  the  JPY/USD  exchange  rate  during  the  zero-interest  rate  period. 
Regardless  of  whether  or  not  the  market  is  aware  of  intervention.  The  paper  rejects  the 
hypothesis  of  a  systematic  and  significant  link  between  days  when  there  is  a  rumor  of 
intervention but no intervention occurs, and the JPY/USD exchange rate. Similarly, the paper 
shows that official statements are insignificant and do not influence the exchange rate.  
With  market  awareness  shown  not  to  be  important  and  constrained  monetary  policy 
preventing the signaling channel from functioning, the effects of Japanese interventions during 
the  zero-interest  rate  period  are  consistent  only  with  the  workings  of  the  portfolio  balance 
channel. This is a remarkable finding, demonstrating that the portfolio balance channel matters 
more than most studies seem to suggest and, therefore, that sterilized intervention is, in principle, 
an independent policy instrument. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the data. Section 3 presents 
the  empirical  analysis.  Section  4  discusses  the  empirical  results,  model  extensions,  and 
robustness  checks.  Section  5 assesses the  economic importance of the  Japanese intervention 
policy. Section 6 concludes.  
 
   6 
2.  Data 
The official Japanese intervention data consists of daily volumes of intervention operations in the 
JPY/USD  foreign  exchange  market.  During  the  zero-interest  rate  intervention  period  under 
study, 1 January 1999 to 31 March 2004, all official interventions in the JPY/USD market are 
sales of JPY against purchases of USD.
7 
Table  1  shows  intervention  data  summary  statistics.  The  table  shows  that  Japan 
intervenes in the JPY/USD exchange ra te market on a total of 159 days  over the full sample 
period. Only 30 of the intervention days occur between 1 January 1999 and 13 January 2003, 78 
intervention days occur between 14 January 2003 and 25 December 2003, while 51 intervention 
days occur between 26 December 2003 and 31 March 2004.  
The cumulated intervention amount across the entire zero -interest rate period is nearly 
USD 0.5 trillion. The average daily amount of intervention ranges from nearly USD 5 billion 
during the 1 January 1999 to 13 January 2003 period to USD 2.2 billion during the  14 January 
2003 to 25 December 2003  period. The average daily  intervention amount relative to average 
daily market turnover is 1.3% across the full sample period, and ranges from roughly 2% during 
the first sub-period to roughly 1% during the second and third sub-periods. 
  The Factiva search engine and a comprehensive combination of various search words 
(e.g. Bank of Japan, intervention etc.) are used to find the days with a rumor of intervention. The 
second row of Table 2 shows that a total of 269 days across the full sample are associated with a 
rumor of intervention.  Row three of Table 2  reports  that 92 of the rumor days are also 
intervention days, i.e. 92 of the 269 rumors are “true”. Row four shows that, accordingly, the 
remaining 67 of the 159 intervention days in the full sample do not coincide with a rumor of 
                                                 
7 The U.S. government did not intervene in the JPY/USD exchange rate market during the zero-interest rate period.   7 
intervention. For the full sample, as many as 177 rumor days are, in fact, “false”. The number of 
days associated with false rumors is reported in row five.
 8 
Factiva  is  also  used  to  find  newswire  reports  of  official  statements  in  support  of 
intervention  and/or  a  weaker  JPY  (“positive  statements”),  and  newswire  reports  of  official 
statements  suggesting  that  further  intervention  in  the  JPY/USD  rate  is  not  recommended  or 
unlikely (“negative statements”). Rows six and seven of Table 2, respectively, report a total of 
108 positive and 17 negative statements for the full sample period.
9 
The analysis follows Ito (2003) and others in using New York close quote s of the daily 
JPY/USD exchange rate.  The exchange rate data are obtained from Global Financial Data 
(GFD). 
A comprehensive list of macro news control variables capture the surprise component of 
Japanese news regarding CPI, GDP, Industrial Production, Trad e Balance, Unemployment and 
the surprise component of US news regarding CPI, GDP, Industrial Production, Trade Balance, 
(Non-Farm Payroll) Employment, and Monetary Policy. For each of these macro news control 
variables, the surprise measure is the difference between official announcements and results of 
surveys of expectations of these announcements conducted by Bloomberg during the days 
preceding the announcements. The official value of a news variable is announced once a month, 
or at a lower frequency.  The news control variables capture the associated surprise element on 
announcement dates, thus these variables are non -zero only on announcement dates and only 
when the announcement differs from market expectations.  
                                                 
8 It is not surprising to find a large number of false rumors of intervention. For example, Chang (2006) reports a total 
of 282 JiJi News (local Japanese newswire) and Wall Street Journal reports of rumors and speculation of Japanese 
intervention over the January 2000 to March 2003 time period when only 101 actual interventions occur. Other 
studies also question the accuracy of newswire reports of intervention (see Fischer 2006 and others). 
9 For completeness, Factiva is also gleaned for “firm” reports of intervention. Row eight of Table 2 shows that for 
the full sample, a total of 31 firm reports of intervention are found. This seems broadly consistent with Chang (2006) 
who finds 27 “firm” reports of intervention in the Wall Street Journal between January 2000 and March 2003.   8 
Summary statistics for the JPY/USD exchange rate and the macro news surprises are 
displayed in Table 3. 
 
3.  Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis follows Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) in estimating a regression equation 
with residuals modeled as a GARCH process. The basic empirical relationship of the analysis is 
given by the GARCH(p,q) specification: 
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where a is a constant;  t s   is the first-difference in the log of the spot JPY/USD exchange rate; 
INT  is  official  intervention  (millions  of  USD);  INT
RUMOR  is  an  interaction  variable  (“slope 
shifter”) containing intervention (millions of USD) on days when there is a rumor of intervention 
(i.e.  INT
RUMOR  contains  actual  interventions  of  which  the  market  is  aware);  INT
JAN03  is  an 
interaction variable containing interventions (millions of USD) carried out between 14 January 
2003  and  25  December  2003;    INT
DEC03  is  an  interaction  variable  containing  interventions 
(millions of USD) carried out between 26 December 2003 and 31 March 2004; RUMOR
NoINT is 
an indicator variable that takes on the value one when a rumor of intervention is reported but no 
actual intervention takes place, and zero otherwise (i.e. RUMOR
NoINT captures the days where   9 
the market suspects an intervention taking place but no actual intervention occurs); POSSTAT is 
an indicator variable that takes on the value one on a day when there is an official statement in 
support of intervention and/or a weaker JPY, and zero otherwise; NEGSTAT is an indicator 
variable that takes on the value one on a day when there is an official statement suggesting that 
further intervention in the JPY/USD rate is not recommended or unlikely, and zero otherwise; C 
is  the  coefficient  vector  associated  with  the  control  variables  contained  in  Zt.  The  control 
variable matrix Zt contains the unexpected component of Japanese news regarding CPI (JPCPI), 
GDP  (JPGDP),  Industrial  Production  (JPIP),  Trade  Balance  (JPTB),  Unemployment 
(JPUNEMP), and the surprise component of US news regarding CPI (USCPI), GDP (USGDP), 
Industrial Production (USIP), Trade Balance (USTB), Employment (USNFPR), and Monetary 
Policy (USFOMC).
10 
  Equation (2) states that the error term is normally distributed with zero mean and time -
dependant (conditional) variance  t h .  Equation  (3)  shows  that  the  variance  depends  on  the 
squared error of the past q periods (the ARCH terms) and the conditional variance of the past p 
periods. 
  The estimation strategy is as follows. First, simultaneous estimations of equations (1) 
through (3) are carried out across the full sample. Next, insignificant variables are dropped one 
variable at a time, starting with the most insignificant variable, and the full sample model re-
estimated until only significant variables remain. This procedure is repeated separately across 
                                                 
10  Ito  (2003  and  2005)  suggests  that  a  new  intervention  policy  regime  began  on  14  January  2003  when  Mr. 
Mizoguchi replaced Mr. Kuroda as Vice Minister for International Affairs at the Japanese Ministry of Finance 
whereas Mr. Kuroda’s replacement of Mr. Sakikabara in July 1999 did not mark a change in policy. The inclusion of 
the interactive dummy INT
JAN03 tests whether this regime change affects the effectiveness of intervention. Moreover, 
towards the end of 2003, the intervention frequency increased noticeably to intervention occurring every week. This 
increase  in  frequency  continued  until  interventions  seized  in  March  2004.  Inclusion  of  the  interactive  dummy 
INT
DEC04  formally  tests  whether  this  change  in  intervention  frequency  further  affects  the  effectiveness  of 
intervention.    10 
sub-samples. For each of the estimations, the most parsimonious GARCH specification possible, 
that still allows for acceptance of the null hypothesis of no ARCH in the standardized residuals, 
is selected. As it turns out, GARCH(1,1) models give the better fit in all cases. 
 
4.  Results 
Table 4 shows the GARCH(1,1) baseline estimations across the full sample. The first column 
displays the results pertaining to the model with all variables included. The basic intervention 
variable  INT  is  highly  significant  (at  99%)  and  of  the  correct  (positive)  sign,  thus  the 
(alternative) hypothesis that intervention sales of JPY during the zero-interest rate period are, on 
average, effective and systematically associated with JPY depreciation is accepted. By contrast, 
the INT
RUMOR slope shifter variable is highly insignificant, thereby rejecting the hypothesis that 
intervention  of  which  the  market  is  aware  (i.e.  intervention  that  coincides  with  a  rumor  of 
intervention)  influences  the  exchange  rate  differently.  Similarly,  the  RUMOR
NoINT  indicator 
variable is highly insignificant, thus rejecting the hypothesis that a rumor of intervention is in 
itself sufficient to elicit a detectable exchange rate movement.  
Both the sub-sample slope shifter variables, INT
JAN03 and INT
DEC03, are significant, at 
95%  and  99%,  respectively.  Both  are  negative,  thereby  implying  that  the  average  effect  of 
intervention is markedly smaller from 14 January 2003 and onwards and, furthermore, that the 
average effect of intervention is even smaller towards the very end of the sample. The highly 
insignificant  POSSTAT  and  NEGSTAT  variables  show  that  official  statements  (“oral 
intervention”)  do  not  impact  the  exchange  rate  during  this  particular  macroeconomic 
environment. Finally, some significant effects of Japanese macro surprises are detected, while 
none of the US macro surprise variables are significant.   11 
The second column of Table 4 shows the estimation results of the full sample baseline 
model  with  only  significant  variables  included.  The  coefficient  estimates  of  the  significant 
explanatory  variables  are  practically  the  same  (pair-wise)  across  the  two  models,  and  the 
previously described results are repeated. 
The conditional variance equation estimates confirm the presence of ARCH effects in the 
exchange rate time series. The ARCH-F and Q
2 tests indicate that both full sample models are 
free of any ARCH effects left in the standardized residuals. Moreover, the standard F-test cannot 
reject the models.
11 
Since the interaction variable INT
JAN03 clearly belongs in the full sample specification, 
the rest of the analysis of the paper is carried out  separately across two sub-samples, the 1 
January 1999 to 13 January 2003 sample (“the Sakikabara/Kuroda intervention period”) and the 
14 January 2003 to 31 March 2004 sample (“the Mizoguchi intervention period”).
12  
The results of the baseline estimations carried out separately on the two sub-samples are 
displayed in Table 5. The first column of Table 5 shows the results of the baseline estimations on 
the 1 January 1999 to 13 January 2003 sample, and the second column shows the 14 January 
2003 to 31 March 2004 results. For both sub-samples, the intervention variable INT is, once 
again, highly significant (at 99%) and of the correct sign.
13 Moreover, the slope shifter variable 
INT
04 included in the second sub-sample is significant (at 95%) and negative, thereby confirming 
the full sample finding that intervention is significantly less effective during the latter part of the 
Mizoguchi intervention period. Consistent with the full sample findings, neither INT
RUMOR nor 
                                                 
11 This also holds true for the estimations reported in Tables 5 through 7. 
12 The time-period associated with the INT
DEC03 slope shifter variable is too short to facilitate a separate meaningful 
estimation. Instead, INT
DEC03 is also included in the 14 January 2003 to 31 March 2004 sub-sample estimations. 
13 Interestingly, the coefficient estimate associated with INT during the  Sakikabara/Kuroda period is about twice as 
large as during the Mizoguchi intervention period. Furthermore, a standard Wald test strongly rejects equality of the 
two coefficient estimates. Ito (2005) conjectures that interventions during the Mitzoguchi period are less effect ive 
due to increased uncertainty among financial market participants in regards to when interventions are carried out and 
what the interventions are meant to achieve.   12 
RUMOR
NoInt are significant, and none of the statement variables is significant. This is the case 
for both sub-samples.  
  To  summarize  the  findings  of  the  baseline  estimations,  intervention  during  the  zero-
interest rate period is, on average, effective in influencing the level of the exchange rate. The 
average effect of interventions carried out during the Sakikabara/Kuroda period is significantly 
stronger than the average effect of interventions carried out during the subsequent Mitzoguchi 
intervention period. Whether or not there is a coincident rumor of intervention, i.e. whether or 
not the market is aware of the intervention operation, is unimportant and does not help explain 
the associated exchange rate movement. A related finding is that neither a statement regarding 
exchange rate or intervention policy nor rumors of intervention on days with no intervention play 
a significant role in explaining day-to-day exchange rate movements.  
Overall, the findings clearly show that intervention carried out during the zero-interest 
rate  period  is  effective  and,  by  elimination  of  other  possible  transmission  channels,  that 
intervention  works  through  the  portfolio-balance  channel.  This  is  a  remarkable  finding, 
considering that portfolio effects are oftentimes viewed as small and unimportant. However, 
while the importance of the portfolio balance channel  might  reasonably be dismissed in  the 
context  of  small  intervention  volumes  relative  to  large  daily  market  turnover,  the  Japanese 
interventions during the zero-interest rate regime are anything but small. Instead, the average 
daily intervention amount during the Sakikabara/Kuroda zero-interest rate period accounts for 
more than 2% of the average total daily market turnover, and roughly 1% during the Mitzoguchi 
intervention period (details  provided in  Table  1).  In other words,  the  Japanese interventions 
under study  are, on average, of such a magnitude that  it  would seem surprising not  to  find 
evidence of detectable portfolio balance effects.   13 
 
4.1  Delayed Effects 
Exchange rate markets are generally perceived to be highly efficient and characterized by same-
day processing of news, but in the context of unannounced interventions that often occur with the 
market  seemingly  unaware,  it  is  necessary  to  test  for  delayed  effects  to  ensure  that  the 
contemporaneous coefficient estimates fully capture the exchange rate effects. 
  In order to account for the possibility of delayed exchange rate effects, Equation (1) of 
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Table 6  shows the results of simultaneous estimation s of Equations (2) through (4) , 
carried out separately across the two sub-samples. As the table shows, none of the lags of INT is 
significant. As before, the coefficient estimates associated with the contemporaneous effects of 
intervention are highly significant (at 99%)  as well as of the same s ign and virtually the same 
magnitude as in the baseline estimations. Moreover, all lags of the slope shifter variables and the 
indicator variables are insignificant.
14 The complete absence of delayed effects  implies that the 
estimated  contemporaneous  exchange  rate  effect  of  intervention  fully  describes  how  the 
exchange rate responds to intervention. 
                                                 
14 For ease of exposition, only lags of the intervention variable are reported. The unreported results are available 
upon request.   14 
 
4.2   Endogeneity 
To  control  for  endogeneity,  the  analysis  of  this  section  follows  the  daily  data  studies  by 
Humpage (1999) and Namalendran and Naranjo (2000) in first estimating Japanese intervention 
reaction functions in order to capture the expected component of the intervention variable and, 
subsequently, use the residuals from the reaction function estimation as a measure of unexpected 
interventions  (i.e.  the  expected  component  of  intervention  is  subtracted  from  the  actual 
intervention on days when interventions occur). Doing so produces more precise estimates of the 
influence of interventions on the JPY/USD exchange rate that are less affected by simultaneity 
bias. 
Following Ito (2003) and Ito and Yabu (2007), the reaction functions are specified as: 
 
(5)  t t t t t t t INT MAYEAR MADAY TARGET s INT                     1 6 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0  
 
where TARGET is the first-difference of the log of the JPY/USD deviation from an exchange 
rate target of 125 JPY/USD, MADAY is the 21-day moving average of the log of the JPY/USD 
exchange rate, and MAYEAR is the one -year moving average of the log of the JPY/USD 
exchange rate.
15 The reaction function estimations are carried out separately across the 1 January 
1999 to 13 January 2003 period ( the Sakikabara/Kuroda zero-interest rate period) and the 14 
January  2003  to  25  December  2003  period  (the  first  year  of  the  Mitzoguchi  period), 
                                                 
15 The variable TARGET is included (and significant) in the reaction function estimations displayed in Ito (2003), 
but not included in Ito and Yabu (2007). Inclusion of TARGET is possibly problematic due to a high degree of 
collinearity with the JPY/USD exchange rate. As it turns out, TARGET is insignificant in all the estimations and, 
therefore,  subsequently  excluded  from  the  analysis.  The  reaction  function  estimation  results  are  not  shown  for 
brevity but available upon request.   15 
respectively.
16  It  should  be  noted  that  while  the  reaction  function  estimates  are  free  of 
simultaneity bias due to the exclusion of contemporaneous exchange rate changes as explanatory 
variables, the cost of avoiding endogeneity is that there is no account for the possibility of 
within-day  exchange  rate  movements  triggering  and/or  determining  the  size  of  some 
interventions. In other words, the estimated reaction function parameters possibly suffer from 
omitted variable bias instead of endogeneity. 
The results of the re-estimation of the model described in Equations (1) through (3) using 
unexpected intervention in place of actual intervention are shown in Table 7. While these results 
are qualitatively identical to those pertaining to the baseline analysis without controlling for 
endogeneity, it is interesting to notice that  the coefficient estimate associated with  intervention 
during the Sakikabara/Kuroda period (first column of Table 7)  has increased  by almost 20% 
(1.42E06 versus 1.21E06, the latter estimate displayed in the first column of Table 5), consistent 
with the idea that not controlling for endogeneity leads to  a downward simultaneity bias in the 
estimated effect of intervention.
17 
 
4.3  Robustness 
In order to check the robustness of the results, the analysis is also carried out using a different 
estimation  technique,  a  different  conditional  mean  specification,  different  sub-sample 
demarcation  points,  and  the  intervention  reaction  functions  used  to  isolate  the  unexpected 
element of intervention are re-estimated using contemporaneous macro surprises as additional 
                                                 
16  The  increased  intervention  frequency  between  26  December  2003  and  31  March  2004  implies  a  change  in 
intervention policy and thus a separate intervention regime. Since this sub-period is too short for a meaningful 
separate reaction function estimation, it is simply excluded from the reaction function estimations and from the 
associated re-estimation of the baseline model using unexpected intervention in place of actual intervention. 
17 Since the  26 December 2003 to 31 March 2004 sub -period is excluded from the estimations that control for 
endogeneity, the estimations displayed in the second column of Table 7 refer to a different sub -sample than those 
displayed in the second column of Table 5. Therefore, a similar comparison of coefficient estimates associated with 
the Mitzoguchi intervention period is not applicable.   16 
explanatory variables. The robustness results are not reported for brevity but available from the 
author upon request. 
First,  all  estimations  are  carried  out  using  OLS  estimation  techniques  with  robust 
heteroskedasticity- and serial-correlation consistent (HAC) standard errors instead of GARCH. 
All  the  previously  described  baseline  results  reported  in  Tables  4  and  5  regarding  the 
intervention and the statement variables are completely unchanged across both the full sample 
and the two sub-samples. In addition, the augmented delayed effects model as well as the models 
addressing endogeneity are re-estimated using OLS and HAC standard errors, yielding identical 
results to those reported in Tables 6 and 7. 
Second,  the  interventions  are  separated  into  two  separate  variables  containing 
intervention (in millions of USD) on days when there is a rumor of intervention, and intervention 
(in  millions  of  USD)  on  days  when  there  is  no  rumor  of  intervention,  respectively.  INT  is 
dropped  from  the  conditional  mean  model  (Equation  1)  and,  instead,  a  new  variable, 
INT
NoRUMOR, containing intervention (in millions of USD) on days when there is no rumor of 
intervention (i.e. INT
NoRUMOR contains actual interventions of which the market is unaware) is 
included alongside the variable INT
RUMOR (thus the sum of INT
NoRUMOR and INT
RUMOR equals 
INT).  The  baseline  model  is  re-estimated,  and  both  INT
NoRUMOR  and  INT
RUMOR  are  highly 
significant and of the correct (positive) sign. Moreover, a standard coefficient test (Wald test) 
cannot reject equality of the coefficient estimates associated with INT
NoRUMOR and INT
RUMOR, 
thereby confirming the baseline finding that while intervention is, on average, effective during 
the  zero-interest  rate  period  under  study,  rumors,  or  market  awareness,  of  intervention  is 
unimportant.   17 
Third,  the  first  six  months  of  the  sample,  encompassing  the  last  6  months  of  Mr. 
Sakakibara’s  tenure  as  Vice  Minister  for  International  Affairs  at  the  Japanese  Ministry  of 
Finance, are dropped from the analysis. The baseline model is re-estimated across the adjusted 
full sample period (1 July 1999 to 31 March 2004) and across the adjusted first sub-sample 
period (1 July 1999 to 13 January 2003, i.e. “the Kuroda period”). Not surprisingly, given that 
only  four  interventions  occur  between  1  January  1999  and  30  June  1999,  the  previously 
described results are repeated.
18 
Fourth, the intervention reaction function models are extended to include Japanese macro 
surprises that could influence the decision to intervene. As noted earlier, previous studies have 
documented that macro surprises influence day-to-day exchange rate changes. These surprises, 
therefore, can be interpreted as proxies for contemporaneous movements in the exchange rate.
19 
As it turns out, (positive) GDP surprises and (positive) CPI surprises help explain intervention, 
and inclusion of these significant macro surprise variables improve the fit of the reaction 
function models slightly. Re-estimation of the baseline models using  unexpected intervention 
derived from the news augmented reaction function models leads to qualitatively identical results 
as those reported in Table 7. 
 
5.  Economic Effects 
It is standard in the literature on foreign exchange intervention to translate coefficient estimates 
associated with the effects of intervention into measures of the exchange rate effect of a USD 
100 million intervention operation. The second row of Table 8 shows that the estimates translate 
                                                 
18 The four intervention days are 12 January 1999, 10 June 1999, 14 June 1999, and 21 June 1999. 
19 See Fatum and Hutchison (2010).   18 
into exchange rate effects of a USD 100 million intervention ranging from a JPY depreciation of 
0.014% to a JPY depreciation of 0.0015%.
20  
At a first glance, these economic effects seem negligible compared to, for  example, an 
oft-cited point of reference, Dominguez and Frankel (1993 a), who show that their estimat ed 
coefficients correspond to an exchange rate effect of 1.5% of a USD 100 million interventi on. 
The average daily intervention  amounts during the more recent zero -interest rate period  are, 
however,  dramatically different from th ose pertaining to  the older studies  of exchange rate 
markets and intervention, rendering a benchmark based on the economic effects of a USD 100 
million intervention  operation  misleading.
21  A better way to get a sense of the  economic 
importance  of  intervention  is  to  measure  the  exchange  rate  effect  of  the  average  daily 
intervention amount. The third row of Table 8 shows  that the exchange rate effect of average 
daily intervention ranges from an average 0.7% depreciation of the JPY during the first 4 years 
of the zero-interest rate regime to an average 0.11% and 0.04% depreciation during the first year 
and during the last three months, respectively, of the Mitzoguchi intervention period. 
While these numbers certainly show that the average economic effects of intervention are 
not negligible, by construction they do not shed light on the total exchange rate effect of all the 
interventions carried out during the zero-interest rate period. The fifth row of Table 8 shows that 
interventions carried out  during the  4-year Sakikabara/Kuroda period  depreciated the JPY by 
roughly 20%, and the interventions carried out during the 5 -quarter Mitzoguchi  intervention 
                                                 
20 Alternatively, the three coefficient estimates translate into an exchange rate effect associated with a JPY 1 trillion 
intervention ranging from 1.21% to 0.45% to 0.14%, as displayed in the third row of Table 8. These effects are quite 
similar to Ito (2005), who reports the effect of a JPY 1 trillion intervention across the 1995 to early 2003 period to 
be 2.1%, and 0.45% across the early 2003 to March 2004 period. 
21 To illustrate, the average amount of the 27 Japanese interventions carried out between 1991 to 1992 (the first two 
years of the now publicly available daily Japanese intervention data, a period included in the analysis of Dominguez 
and Frankel 1993) is roughly USD 220 million, while the average amount of the 159 Japanese interventions carried 
out during the 1999 to 2004 zero-interest rate period is roughly USD 3 billion (third row of Table 1), i.e. almost 15 
times higher. An exchange rate effect of 1.5% per USD 100 million  during the zero-interest rate period would thus 
imply an improbable JPY depreciation of more than 20% per average daily intervention amount.   19 
period depreciated the JPY by more than 10%, respectively.
22 In other words,  the combined 
economic effect of all the JPY  intervention sales during the zero-interest rate period is, ceteris 
paribus, a very substantial JPY depreciation of roughly 30%.  
A straightforward counterfactual assessment of what might have been the  JPY/USD rate 
at the time the active Japanese intervention regime ended in March 2004 had these interventions 
not occurred suggests that the rate would have been in the mid- or high 70s (second-last row of 
Table 8). This would constitute a massive deviation from the actual rate in the mid-100s (last 
row of Table 8). The macroeconomic implications of such a strong JPY would likely have been 
devastating for the Japanese economy. Clearly, the economic effects of the interventions carried 




6.  Conclusion 
During the first little more than five years of the Japanese zero-interest rate period, the Japanese 
monetary  authorities  sold  an  unprecedented  total  of  USD  0.5  trillion  worth  of  JPY  in  the 
JPY/USD foreign exchange market. The unusual combination of a prolonged macroeconomic 
period  of  constrained  monetary  policy  and  frequent  as  well  as  oftentimes  large-scale 
interventions provides a “natural experiment” for investigating whether interventions that cannot 
work through the standard signaling channel of future monetary policy can still be effective in 
                                                 
22  These  exchange  rate  effect  estimates  are  broadly  consistent  with  Ito  (2005),  who  calculates  the  combined 
exchange rate effect of the five quarters of intervention during the Mitzoguchi period to a JPY depreciation of 13%. 
23 In light of the substantial effects of these interventions, it is not surprising that the US and some European 
countries grew increasingly concerned with the active Japanese intervention policy during the zero -interest rate 
period.  The concern culminated in   a fairly critical statement issued by the G7 Finance Ministers and Central 
Meeting Governors Meeting in September 2003 in which the desirability of exchange rate flexibility was proponed 
(without any mentioning of which country or countries the statement  was aimed at). See Ito (2005) for additional 
details. See also Taylor (2006) for an interesting discussion of the exchange rate policy of the Bush administration 
and why the Japanese intervention policy was met with relative acceptance.   20 
influencing the level of the exchange rate. Since market awareness of intervention is a necessary 
condition for intervention to work through transmission channels other than the portfolio balance 
channel, the analysis also tests if market awareness plays a role in explaining the link between 
intervention and exchange rate movements when interest rates are at the lower bound.  
Using a GARCH time series methodology for the baseline analysis, the paper shows that 
official intervention, whether or not the market is aware of the intervention, exerts a statistically 
significant  same-day  influence  on  the  JPY/USD  exchange  rate.  Considering  that  market 
awareness  is  shown  to  be  unimportant  and,  moreover,  the  macroeconomic  and  institutional 
environment prevents the signaling channel from functioning, this is a remarkable finding that 
demonstrates that the portfolio balance channel matters after all.  
The  economic  effects  implied  by  the  estimates  of  the  exchange  rate  effects  of 
intervention  when  taking  into  account  the  total  intervention  volumes  spent  by  the  Japanese 
monetary authorities during the zero-interest rate period are very substantial. During the first 4 
years of the zero-interest rate period, the total of USD 0.15 trillion worth of JPY sold against 
USD is associated with a 20% depreciation of the JPY, and during the subsequent 5-quarters, the 
total of USD 0.35 trillion worth of JPY sold is associated with a JPY depreciation of more than 
10%. In other words, the combined economic effect of all the Japanese interventions carried out 
during the zero-interest rate period add up to a JPY depreciation of roughly 30%, implying a 
counterfactual JPY/USD rate in the mid- or high-70s at the time the active Japanese intervention 
regime  ended  in  March  2004  had  these  interventions  not  occurred.  The  macroeconomic 
implications of such a strong JPY would likely have been devastating for the Japanese economy, 
thus the economic importance of the active Japanese intervention policy during the first little 
more than five years of the zero-interest rate regime can hardly be understated.   21 
Clearly, the substantial economic effects of intervention are achieved only because of the 
unprecedented intervention volumes involved. However, the finding that sterilized intervention 
significantly influences the exchange rate level and works through the portfolio channel, even 
when intervention is disconnected from monetary policy, shows that sterilized intervention is, in 
principle, an independent policy instrument. 
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Figure 1:  Japanese Money Market Rate 1990 to 2006 
 
             
NOTES: 
 
(a)  End of month uncollateralized overnight call rate.  
(b)  Source: Bank of Japan.   25 
 
Table 1                               Official Japanese Intervention 1999 to 2004 
  1 January 1999 to 
31 March 2004 
1 January 1999 to  
13 January 2003 
14 January 2003 to 
25 December 2003 
26 December 2003 to 
31 March 2004 
         
Intervention Days  159  30  78  51 
         
Cumulated Amount  464,251  149,428  171,886  142,937 
         
Average Daily Amount  2,920  4,981  2,204  2,803 
         
Standard Deviation  2,974  3,117  2,397  3,178 
         
Average Daily 
Intervention Amount 
Relative to Average 




















(a)  Daily Bank of Japan intervention data obtained from the Japanese Ministry of Finance data bank. 
(b)  All Japanese interventions during the 1999 to 2004 period are sales of JPY against purchases of USD. All 
amounts are in millions of USD. Average Daily Amount and Standard Deviation refer to intervention days only. 
(c)  The  April  2001  BIS  statistic  is  used  for  calculating  the  average  daily  intervention  amount  relative  to 
average daily market turnover for the 1 January 1993 to 13 January 2003 period while the April 2004 BIS statistic is 
used for the calculations pertaining to the two most recent sub-periods. A weighted average calculation is used for 
the full period. Average daily turnover in the JPY/USD market was USD 231 billion in April 2001 and USD 296 
billion in April 2004. Source: BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market 
Activity  in  2001  and  2004,  http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfxf02t.htm  and  http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx05t.htm, 
Statistical Annex Tables E.2. 
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Table 2                         Summary Statistics: Days with Intervention, Rumors, Statements and Reports 
  1 January 1999 to 
31 March 2004 
1 January 1999 to  
13 January 2003 
14 January 2003 to 
25 December 2003 
26 December 2003 
to 31 March 2004 
         
Intervention 
(INT)  159  30  78  51 
         
Rumors of 
intervention 
(RUMOR)  269  136  98  35 
         
Intervention on days 
with a rumor of 
intervention 
(INT
RUMOR)  92  11  54  27 
Intervention on days 
with no rumor of 
intervention 
(INT
NoRUMOR)  67  19  24  24 
Rumor of 
intervention on days 
with no intervention 
(RUMOR
NoINT)  177  125  44  8 
         
Positive statements 
(POSSTAT)  108  70  28  10 
Negative statements 
(NEGSTAT)  17  17  0  0 
         
Reports of 




(a)    INT is official intervention; RUMOR is a rumor of intervention; INT
RUMOR is intervention on days with a 
rumor of intervention; INT
NoRUMOR is intervention on days with no rumor of intervention; RUMOR
NoINT is a rumor 
of intervention when no intervention occurs; POSSTAT is an official statement in support of intervention and/or a 
weaker JPY; NEGSTAT is an official statement suggesting that further intervention in the JPY/USD rate is not 
recommended or unlikely; REP is a firm report of intervention. 
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TABLE 3                           Summary Statistics: The JPY/USD Exchange Rate and the Macro News Surprises 







JPY/USD  116.3350  7.81857  134.73  101.56  1364 
JP CPI  0.00394  0.001456  0.003  -0.002  33 
JP GDP  0.001148  0.005362  0.018  -0.009  27 
JP Industrial Production  -0.00232  0.007961  0.015  -0.017  44 
JP Trade Balance  -6.6374  171.3451  367.10  -363.40  46 
JP Unemployment Rate  -0.0004  0.00161  0.002  -0.004  30 
US CPI  -0.00004  0.001536  0.003  -0.003  26 
US GDP  0.00175  0.006151  0.0120  -0.0110  12 
US Industrial Production  -0.00006  0.002936  0.0070  -0.0050  54 
US Trade Balance  -0.4917  2.3448  3.1000  -5.5000  24 
US Non-Farm Payroll Employment  -38.9032  101.6827  178.0000  -318.000  62 
US FOMC  -0.00083  0.002887  0.0025  -0.0025  3 
 
NOTES: 
   
(a)      All data series run from January 1, 1999 to March 31, 2004. All data are five days a week (Monday to Friday). 
(b)      Data Sources:  The Exchange Rate Series is from Global Financial Data (New York close quotes). The Macro News 
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TABLE 4                        JPY/USD Exchange Rate and Intervention: Baseline Estimations on Full Sample 
GARCH Models 
Daily Data: 1 January 1999 to 31 March 2004 (Full Sample) 
  1 January 1999 to 31 March 2004: 
All Variables 
1 January 1999 to 31 March 2004: 
Significant Variables Only 




∆s(-1)  -0.022 
(0.029) 
- 




















NoINT  -0.340 
(0.503) 
- 
POSSTAT  0.003 
(0.683) 
- 
NEGSTAT  -0.724 
(1.282) 
- 
JPCPI  -0.149 
(0.594) 
- 
JPGDP  -0.179 
(0.186) 
- 
JPIP  0.079 
(0.123) 
- 








USCPI  0.558 
(0.921) 
- 
USGDP  0.466 
(0.734) 
- 
USIP  0.053 
(0.277) 
- 
USTB  -0.001 
(0.001) 
- 
USNFPR  0.001 
(0.011) 
- 
USFOMC  0.220 
(2.793) 
- 
     
Variance Equation     












     
Observations  1364  1364 
R-squared  0.043  0.039 
S.E. of regression  0.006  0.006 
Durbin-Watson   1.981  2.020 
ARCH-F (Q
2)  0.53[0.47]  0.89[0.35] 
Q
2 (2)  0.58[0.75]  0.92[0.63] 




(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** Denotes significance at 95%, *** Denotes significance at 99%. 
(b)    Standard Errors (S.E.) in ( ) below the point estimates; p values in [ ]; lags in ( ) in Variable Names.   29 
(c)    GARCH estimations are defined in Equations (1) (2) and (3) in the text. 
(d)    The dependent variable (∆s) is the first difference of the log of the daily JPY/USD spot exchange rate. 
(e)    The independent variables:  INT is the daily intervention volume; INT
RUMOR is the intervention volume on days with no rumor of 
intervention; INT
03 is the daily intervention volume during the 14 January 2003 to 25 December 2003 period; INT
04 is the daily 
intervention volume during the 26 December 2003 to 31 March 2004  period; RUMOR
NoINT is an indicator variable that takes on the 
value 1 on days when there is a rumor of intervention but no intervention occurs, and 0 otherwise; POSSTAT is an  indicator variable 
that takes on the value 1 on days when there is an official statement in support of intervention and/or a weaker JPY, and 0 otherwise; 
NEGSTAT is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 on days when there is an official statement suggesting that further 
intervention in the JPY/USD rate is unlikely or not recommended, and 0 otherwise. 
(f)    Control  Variables are measuring macro news surprises (difference between actual announcement and survey  expectations 
extracted from Bloomberg) regarding Japanese CPI (JPCPI), GDP (JPGDP), Industrial Production (JPIP), Trade Balance (JPTB), and 
Unemployment (JPUNEMP), and US CPI (USCPI), GDP (USGDP), Industrial Production (USIP), Trade Balance (USTB), Non-Farm 
Payroll Employment (USNFPR), and Interest Rate Changes (USFOMC). 
(g)    The conditional mean constant, RUMOR
NoINT, POSSTAT, NEGSTAT, JPTB, and USNFPR are multiplied by 10




04, and the constant associated with the variance equation, are multiplied by 10
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TABLE 5                        JPY/USD Exchange Rate and Intervention: Baseline Estimations on Sub-Samples 
GARCH Models 
Daily Data: 1 January 1999 to 31 March 2004 
  1 January 1999 to 13 January 2003:  
Significant Intervention Variables 
14 January 2003 to 31 March 2004:  
Significant Intervention Variables 













     
Variance Equation     












     
Observations  1048  316 
R-squared  0.038  0.053 
S.E. of regression  0.007  0.005 
Durbin-Watson   2.019  1.976 
ARCH-F (Q
2)  0.15[0.70]  0.04[0.84] 
Q
2 (2)  0.63[0.73]  3.80[0.15] 




(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** Denotes significance at 95%, *** Denotes significance at 99%. 
(b)    Standard Errors (S.E.) in ( ) below the point estimates; p values in [ ]; lags in ( ) in Variable Names. 
(c)    GARCH estimations are defined in Equations (1) (2) and (3) in the text. 
(d)    The dependent variable (∆s) is the first difference of the log of the daily JPY/USD spot exchange rate. 
(e)    The independent variables:  INT is the daily intervention volume; INT
04 is the daily intervention volume during the 26 December 
2003 to 31 March 2004  period;  
(f)    Significant control variables measuring macro news surprises are included but not shown for ease of exposition.  
(g)    The conditional mean constant is multiplied by 10
3; and INT, INT
04, and the constant associated with the variance equation, are 
multiplied by 10
6 for readability. 
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TABLE 6                          JPY/USD Exchange Rate and Intervention: Delayed Effects 
GARCH Models 
Daily Data: 1 January 1999 to 31 March 2004 
  1 January 1999 to 13 January 2003  14 January 2003 to 31 March 2004 

































     
Variance Equation     












     
Observations  1048  316 
R-squared  0.041  0.056 
S.E. of regression  0.007  0.008 
Durbin-Watson   2.01  1.97 
ARCH-F (Q
2)  0.70[0.40]  0.05[0.83] 
Q
2 (2)  0.72[0.70]  3.47[0.18] 




(a)    See notes to Table 5. 
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TABLE 7                          JPY/USD Exchange Rate and Intervention: Controlling for Endogeneity 
GARCH Models 
Daily Data: 1 January 1999 to 31 March 2004 
  1 January 1999 to 13 January 2003  14 January 2003 to 25 December 2003 









     
Variance Equation     












     
Observations  1048  316 
R-squared  0.041  0.047 
S.E. of regression  0.007  0.005 
Durbin-Watson   2.01  2.13 
ARCH-F (Q
2)  0.14[0.71]  0.57[0.45] 
Q
2 (2)  0.59[0.75]  1.79[0.41] 




(a)    The independent variable INT
UNEXP is the residual of the Bank of Japan intervention reaction function (defined in Equation 5 in 
the text) multiplied by an intervention indicator variable. The intervention indicator variable takes on the value 1 when intervention 
occurs and 0 otherwise. 
(b)    For all other notes see notes to Table 5. 
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Table 8                                Economic Effects of Intervention 
  1 January 1999 to  
13 January 2003 
14 January 2003 to 
25 December 2003 
26 December 2003 to 
31 March 2004 
       
Coefficient Estimate  0.00000142  0.00000052  0.00000015 
       
Exchange Rate Effect of 
a USD 100 Million 
Intervention 
0.0142%  0.0052%  0.0015% 
       
Exchange Rate Effect  
of a JPY 1 Trillion 
Intervention  
1.21%  0.45%  0.14% 
       
Exchange Rate Effect of 
average daily 
Intervention 
0.71%  0.11%  0.04% 
       
Exchange Rate Effect of 
Total Within-Period 
Intervention 
20.81%  8.82%  2.15% 




98  80  76 








(a)  The coefficient estimates for the 1 January 1999 to 13 January 2003 period and the 
14 January to 25 December 2003 period are from the models that control for endogeneity 
(results displayed in Table 7); the coefficient estimate for the 26 December 2003 to 31 
March 2004 period is the sum of the coefficient estimates associated with INT and INT
04 
from the baseline estimations (results  displayed in Table 5 ). Coefficient estimates are 
associated with a USD 1 million intervention. 
(b)  The exchange rate effect of a JPY 1 trillion intervention is calculated using 
JPY/USD exchange rate averages. The average JPY/USD exchange rate s across the three 
sub-periods are 117.04, 115.86, and 107.22, respectively. 
(c)           The average daily intervention amount s (in billions of USD) across the three sub-
periods are 4.9, 2.2 and 2.8, respectively. 
(c)  The exchange rate effect of the total amount of in tervention is the total  within-
period intervention in trillions of JPY times the  associated exchange rate effect of a JPY 1 
trillion intervention. 
(d)           The counterfactual end-of-period exchange rate is the start-of-period rate net of the 
actual  within-period  percentage  rate  change  minus  the  effect  of  total  within -period 
intervention. The start-of-period rate for the first sub-period is 111.85 (the actual JPY/USD 
rate primo 1999), the start-of-period rate for the subsequent periods is the counterfac tual 
end-of-period rate of the immediately preceding sub-period (98 and 80, respectively). 
 
 